Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

John W. Zupon v. Kaiser Steel Corporation, the
Uninsured Employers' Fund, the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund and the Industrial commision of
Utah : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Virginius Dabney; Dabney and Dabney; Attorney for Petitioner.
Benjamin A. Sims; Utah Industrial Commission; Attorney for Industrial Commission of Utah; Erie
V. Boorman; Employers' Reinsurance Fund; Attorney for Employers' reinsurance Fund; Edwin C.
Barnes; Clyde & Pratt; Attorney for Kaiser Steel Corporation .
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Zupon v. Kaiser Steel Corporation, No. 920569 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3533

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

rAH
OCUMENT

FU
*ck

SKCTNO.S£!-^JaEAEt£OURT OF APPEALS
JOHN W. ZUPON,
Petitioner,
vs.
Case No. 920569-CA
KAISER STEEL CORPORATION,
the UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,
the EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
and the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Priority

Respondents.

BRIEF

OF

PETITIONER

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
DENIAL

REVIEW OF

ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
P.O. BOX 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
Attorney for Industrial
Commission of Utah

Virginius Dabney, Esq.
DABNEY & DABNEY, p.c.
350 South 400 East, Suite .
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Petitioner

Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
Post Office Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorney for the Employer's'
Reinsurance Fund
Edwin C. Barne.
CLYDE & PRATT
77 West 200 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Kaiser Steel Corporation
and the Uninsured Employers' Fund

mms

TABLE

OF

C O N T E N T S
Page

Table of Authorities

ii

Jurisdiction of the Court

1

Statement of the Issue(s)/Standard of Appellate Review

. . . .1

Determinative Statute(s)/Rule(s)

2

Statement of the Case

2

A.

Nature of the Case

2

B.

Course of Proceedings

3

C.

Disposition Below

3

D.

Statement of the Facts

3

Summary of Argument(s)
Argument
I.

5

THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED
WORKER

5

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO SHIFT THE BURDEN TO
THE EMPLOYER TO FIND A LINE OF WORK THE PETITIONER COULD
DO

8

III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR IN IGNORING
IT'S PRIOR FINDINGS AND DECISIONS THAT AT LEAST 10% OF
PETITIONER'S WHOLE BODY, PERMANENT PARTIAL IMPAIRMENT WAS
DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT

10

II.

IV.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IMPROPERLY FAILED TO AWARD
PETITIONER PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION DUE
TO PETITIONER'S INJURIES WHICH WERE OCCASIONED BY HIS
1975 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT

13

Conclusion/Statement of Relief Sought

14

Addendum

17

1

T A B L E

OF

A U T H O R I T I E S
CASES:
Page

Action v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987)

12

Adams v, Board of Review. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991) . . . .

11

Askrew v. Industrial Commission. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964) . . . 6
Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965)

... 6

Chandler v. Industrial Commission.
184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919)

6

Frito-Lay. Inc. v. Jacobs. 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984)

. . . .

10

Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review.
776 P. 2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)

12

Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990)

. . . .

5

J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission.
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983)
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission..

5

709 P. 2d 1168 (Utah 1985)

10

Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233 (Utah 1983)

12

M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission.
189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948)

6

McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977) . . . 6
Marshall v. Industrial Commission. 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985) . . 7
Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review.
817 P.2d 328 (Utah 1991)
Morton International. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah
State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991)
Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330
(Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991)

2
2
. .

12

Prows v. Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980) . . . 5
Rucker v. Da It on. 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979))
ii

12

State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission,
685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984)

2, 5

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-66 (1974)

13

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1975)

2

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53(2) (1988)

1

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-86 (1988)

1

Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16 (1988)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(c) (1988)

1/2
1

RULES
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

iii

1

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's
August

3,

1992

Order

Denying

Petitioner's

Motion

for

Review

alleging entitlement to workers' compensation benefits sustained as
a result of an industrial accident.

A Petition for Review of that

Order was timely filed with this Court on September 1, 1992.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 351-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
There are three substantial issues presented for review:
(1)

whether the Industrial Commission applied the wrong

standard of proof to Petitionees injuries and did not properly
shift the burden to the employer to find a line of work the
Petitioner could do;
(2)

whether the Industrial Commission committed error in

ignoring it's prior findings and decisions that at least 10% of
Petitioner's whole body, permanent partial impairment was directly
and exclusively attributable to the industrial accident; and,
(3)

whether the Industrial Commission improperly failed to

award Petitioner permanent, total disability compensation due to
Petitioner's injuries and inability to return to work which were
occasioned by his 1975 industrial accident.

1

The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to
the agency's view of the law is required.

Utah Administrative

Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4) (d)
(1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah
1991). Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE(S)/RULE(S)
Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

35-1-67

(1975)

is

the

determinative statute in this case. It is set forth in full in the
Addendum thereto as Exhibit A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Zupon seeks review of the Industrial Commission Order
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to
workers,

compensation

benefits

occasioned

by

his

industrial

accident.
Course of Proceedings
Mr. Zupon filed an application for permanent, total disability
compensation benefits sustained as the result of an industrial
injury which occurred on or about August 7, 1975.
Respondents

alleged

that Mr.

Zupon

failed

(R. at 1) .

to prove medical

causation and is thus not entitled to permanent, total disability

2

benefits.

(R. at 4, 21).

A formal hearing was held before an

Administrative Law Judge on February 6, 1992. (R. at 7).
Disposition Below
On

May

24,

1991

Petitioner

filed

for

permanent

total

disability benefits alleging that as the result of his August 7,
1975 industrial injury he was no longer able to work.

The

Administrative Law Judge on March 18, 1992, found that there was no
medical causal connection between the industrial accident and the
Petitioner's total disability.

His claim for permanent, total

disability benefits was dismissed with prejudiced.

(R. at 21-31,

copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit B ) .
Mr. Zupon filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial
Commission which was subsequently denied on August 3, 1992. (R. at
46-51, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C).

He challenges that

final agency action in this Petition for Review.
Statement of the Facts
On August 7, 1975, Mr. Zupon experienced an industrial injury
to his lower back while employed by Kaiser Steel Corporation.
at 83) .

(R.

At that time, Mr. Zupon was lifting an acetylene tank

which was 5 feet long and 18 inches in diameter and weighed around
200 pounds. As he started to lift the tank off the ground the tank
was off to his side and thus he was twisting as he lifted the tank.
(R. at 22).

He immediately felt a sharp pain in his low back just

below his belt line.

(R. at 22).

He was seen the day of the accident by Dr. S. Smoot at Carbon
Medical Services Association, who continued to treat him until
3

November 13, 1975.

(R. at 85, 100-110).

He was also subsequently

seen by Dr. Chapman, who on June 22, 1976 found that he was
permanently disabled. (R. at 220).

Mr. Zupon never returned to

work after the industrial injury and he was awarded social security
disability benefits beginning on January 1, 1977.

(R. at 239).

A Medical Panel was appointed which subsequently found that
Mr.

Zupon suffered

from a 60% whole body permanent, partial

impairment and that 10% of that impairment was due to the 1975
industrial accident.

(R. at 87-89). The Panel specifically agreed

with Mr. Zupon's treating physician "... that the claimant cannot
do mining or mechanic work," and further referenced his "...
inability

to work".

(R. at 88).

On February

10, 1977 the

Industrial Commission awarded him permanent, partial impairment
benefits based on the 10% related to the 1975 industrial accident
only. (R. at 90-92).
On May 24, 1991, Mr. Zupon filed a new claim for additional
benefits, i.e., permanent, total disability benefits, alleging that
as a result of his August 7, 1975 industrial injury he was no
longer able to work. (R. at 1) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S)
Mr. Zupon is entitled to have the benefit and presumption in
the law as it existed at the time of his industrial injury. Under
pre-1988 law, the employer had the burden of finding a line of
employment which an employee could perform.
failed to meet this burden in this case.
4

The employer wholly

There was absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support the
Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Mr. Zupon's lumbar
condition and his subsequent inability to work was the exclusive
result of conditions which pre-dated his 1975 industrial accident.
Rather

the

Medical

Panel

found

that

there

was

a

10%/50%

industrial/pre-existing split of his substantial overall, whole
body permanent, partial impairment, and there is uncontroverted
evidence in the record of his total disability status as well.

ARGUMENT
I
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED
WORKER.
Few principles of workers' compensation law are as well
established in this State as that workers7 compensation disability
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits,
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor
of the claim.

Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this

principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund.
796 P.2d

676

(Utah 1990); State Tax Commission v. Industrial

Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); J & W Janitorial Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 661 P.2d 949
Industrial

Commission, 610 P.2d

1362

(Utah 1983); Prows v.
(Utah 1980); McPhie v.

Industrial Commission, 567 P. 2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977); Baker v.
Industrial

Commission,

405

P.2d

613

(Utah

1965);

Askrew v.

Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v.
5

Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v.
Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra at 1021-1022,
discussed the proper construction of the Workers7 Compensation Act
and the underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows:
We are also reminded that our statute requires that
the statues of this state are to be liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice.'
*

*

*

*

*

*

In this connection it must be remembered that the
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his
dependents in case death supervenes.
The right to
compensation arises out of the relation existing between
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to
*employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or
death to provide adequate means for the support of those
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of
total disability or death of the employee his dependents
might become the objects of public charity, such a
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the
cost of producing and selling the product of such
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason,
if for no other. should receive a very liberal
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are
all united upon the proposition that in view of the
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as
the case may be. (Emphasis added).
6

The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her Findings of Fact
and

Conclusions

of Law

failed

to apply

this vital rule of

construction. Nowhere in her Findings or Conclusions is there any
evidence of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in
favor of the claim". Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in
the record, the Administrative Law Judge construed it against the
injured worker.

Her finding of a lack of medical causation, for

the reasons set forth below, is simply not supported by the record.
The "findings" and "conclusions" do not evidence "humane and
beneficent purposes" as required by law.
basis of her Order is thus flawed.

The entire underlying

This same defect carried over

to the Industrial Commission's final agency action, and it is
similarly flawed. The final Order should be reversed due to these
conceptional flaws.

II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO SHIFT THE BURDEN TO
THE EMPLOYER TO FIND A LINE OF WORK THE PETITIONER COULD
DO.
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability
benefits related to an August 7, 1975 industrial back accident and
thus pre-1988 law applies.

The Administrative Law Judge in her

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order required Applicant
to met a higher standard of proof than is found in the law.
Mr. Zupon is entitled to the benefit of the law as it existed at
the time of his injury, as stated in the Supreme Court decision of
Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985).
7

Under pre-1988 law, the fact that the employee cannot go back
to work at his usual line of employment shifts the burden of proof
to the Employer to find a line of employment that the employee can
in fact do or learn to do.

It was never disputed that Mr. Zupon

was unable to return to his usual line of employment, or that Mr.
Zupon was trained to do something else, or could have done
something else. In addition, the Medical Panel in its Findings of
Fact Number 3, specifically noted "... this man's inability to
return to work". (R. at 89).
In this case, there was no testimony or evidence whatsoever
indicating the Employer's willingness or efforts to attempt to
employ Mr. Zupon in another line of work, nor was there any
evidence of any attempt to retrain him in another job.

The

Employer thus failed to meet the shifted burden, the result of
which must be an appropriate compensation award on remand.
The Administrative Law Judge in her Order stated that "I found
... that the applicant did not show that his lumbar problems alone
prevented

him from returning to his usual line of employment."

(R. at 29) (Emphasis added).

There is no such requirement in Utah

workers compensation law and in fact the law is that a combination
of industrial and non-industrial factors may result in a permanent,
total disability award. To the extent that the Administrative Law
Judge made such a finding, she further did so without reference or
citation to the testimony or medical records. The evidence at the
hearing, was directly contrary, i.e., that the Employer did not
take Mr. Zupon back to work because of his back problem.
8

Their

refusal to continue to employ him was based entirely on his lumbar
condition and had little to do with his subsequent arthritis in his
hands, or the difficulties he

later developed

in his upper

extremities.
As a result of Mr. Zupon's not being able to return to work,
Respondents then had the burden to prove that Mr. Zupon was capable
of

performing,

or

being

vocationally

retrained

to

perform,

substantial, gainful employment. Such evidence was neither argued
nor supported by documentary or testimonial evidence of any kind
whatsoever.

The record does, however, show that Mr. Zupon made

several unsuccessful attempts to return to work, and even contacted
the Division of Rehabilitative Services of the Utah State Board of
Education for their assistance, all of which unfortunately failed
to produce any meaningful vocational results.
In conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court ruling in Marshall,
supra. instructs that once an injured worker is unable to return to
his former employment - as in this case - the burden shifts to the
employer to find work for the employee, or train the employee to
learn to do some other line of work in which he could become
substantially, gainfully employed.
case that the Employer did

There is not evidence in this

anything to enhance Mr. Zupon7 s

employment possibilities, and in fact, the uncontroverted evidence
is to the effect that it simply declined to permit him to return to
work as a coal miner, and took no further actions whatsoever to
assist him

in locating suitable employment.

9

Therefore, the

Employer failed to meet its burden, and the entry of an appropriate
permanent, total disability award is now required.

Ill
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR IN IGNORING
IT'S PRIOR FINDINGS AND DECISIONS THAT AT LEAST 10% OF
PETITIONERS WHOLE BODY, PERMANENT PARTIAL IMPAIRMENT WAS
DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT,
The Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Mr. Zupon's
lumbar condition is almost entirely the result of conditions that
pre-existed his 1975 industrial accident is totally unsupported by
anything in the record. The Medical Panel report found that there
was a 10%/50% split of his rather substantial overall, whole body
permanent, partial impairment with 10% due to the industrial
accident and 50% due to pre-existing conditions.
There was no evidence presented which indicated in any way
that Mr. Zupon's inability to work was related to his asymptomatic
degenerative arthritis in his back as distinguished from that
portion that was directly attributable to his industrial accident.
The Administrative Law Judge does not specifically refer to any
evidence to back up that allegation and in fact none exists. The
Industrial Commission's acceptance of that view - also without
support - is similarly defective.
There was no medical evidence offered at the hearing which
would even slightly suggest that Petitioner's disability was not at
least partially the result of the industrial accident, and the
Respondents failed to offer any conflicting medical evidence.
10

Significantly, Mr. Zupon continued to work with his pre-existing
problems and only ceased working at a very young age immediately
after his 1975 industrial accident.
cannot

summarily

ignore

or

The Industrial Commission

arbitrarily

discount

competent,

uncontradicted evidence without some rational basis for doing so.
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission., 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah
1985).

Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984).

The actual Findings of Fact portion of the Order in this
matter

are grossly

requirements.
Administrative

No
Law

inadequate and do not meet recent legal
specific
Judge

Findings

merely

comments, the evidence presented.

are

made,

summarized,

with

rather

the

editorial

Such summary conclusions do not

constitute proper fact-finding. The Industrial Commissions Order
is similarly flawed.

In the recent case of Adams v. Board of

Review. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals
stated, as follows:
While the purported 'Findings of Fact' written by
the A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence
presented, such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a
finding to truly constitute a 'finding of fact,' it must
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred....
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the
Commission accepted one version over another.
The
evidence shows several possible configurations and
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes,
if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact
occurred.
Since we cannot even determine why the
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of
11

the possible subsidiary findings.
therefore inadequate. Id. at 20.

The findings are

Although none of the parties, including the Administrative Law
Judge, dispute the fact that Petitioner is presently permanently
and totally disabled, neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the
Industrial Commission support their conclusion that Mr. Zupon's
permanent, total disability was not caused by the 1975 industrial
injury. The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission
spend a great deal of time discussing Petitioner's prior medical
problems, but do not make concise findings as to why Petitioner's
permanent, total disability status is not related to his 1975
industrial accident. That failure further manifests itself here in
inadequate findings.
The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

has

recently

informed

this

Commission that:
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336 (Utah 1979))...[T]he failure of an agency to make
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one
conclusion.' Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baucrh, 660 P.2d
233, 236 (Utah 1983)).
Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App.
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
The Industrial Commission's as well as the Administrative Law
Judge's purported Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
should at a minimum be vacated and remanded with instructions to
12

enter a new Order with detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. Failure to
do so, denies Petitioner the ability to marshal the evidence in
support of the findings and show that it is not substantial. Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App.
1989) . If the Industrial Commission were required to do this, its
result would probably be different since its denial of benefits is
simply unsupportable.

IV
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IMPROPERLY FAILED TO AWARD
PETITIONER PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION DUE
TO PETITIONERS INJURIES WHICH WERE OCCASIONED BY HIS
1975 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT,
It is not disputed that the Mr. Zupon suffered from a preexisting impairment of 50% of the whole body that was attributable
to matters present before his industrial accident occurred.

Mr.

Zupon has never been compensated for the pre-existing component of
his industrial accident.
Although it is truef as the Administrative Law Judge argues
that the application for hearing did not indicated that a claim for
additional impairment was being made, a claim was made for the 50%
permanent, partial impairment at the hearing level.

No adverse

party raised the eight-year Statute of Limitation contained in the
prior law.
The Industrial Commission on Motion for Review for the first
time, did not attempt to defend the rational of the Administrative
Law Judge, but rather argued that under Utah Code Annotated,
13

Section 35-1-66 (1974) a claim for permanent, partial disability
benefits must have been filed within eight (8) years of the date of
injury, noting that Mr. Zupon filed his Application for Hearing
some 16 years after the injury.

The defense of the statute of

limitations is an affirmative defense and was never raised by the
Employer or the Uninsured Employers' Fund at the hearing level. As
such, they were barred from asserting it then and are barred from
asserting it now.
It is appropriate that the Industrial Commission enter an
appropriate award for the amount of Mr. Zupon's 50% pre-existing
impairment.

CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
In conclusion, the parties readily acknowledge that Mr. Zupon
is permanently and totally disabled, the only dispute appears to
whether

the evidence

indicates that

it was his pre-existing

conditions rather than his industrial accident which precipitated
that status.
However, the uncontroverted evidence in this case reflects
that Mr. Zupon worked a substantial portion of his life with his
pre-existing conditions, and did not cease working until the
occurrence of his industrial accident in 1975. As a result of that
injury, the uncontroverted evidence further is, that Mr. Zupon was
unable to return to his former work as an underground coal miner;
that Kaiser Coal Corporation refused to rehire him or continue his
employment for them in any capacity; that vocational rehabilitation
14

efforts made by the Division of Rehabilitation Services did not
result in his being able to be retrained; and that after the
occurrence of his industrial accident, he was forced into premature
retirement at age 50 and was never able to return thereafter to
substantial, gainful employment.
Because

of

Mr.

Zupon's

significant

overall

whole

body

impairment equivalent to 60%, his age, his limited formal education
which ended in the 11th grade, and the undisputed fact of his
inability to return to work after the occurrence of the industrial
injury, and his extensive work history which was essentially
limited to heavy work in underground coal mine employment, the
burden shifted to the Employer to find work for him, or retrain him
to perform some work that he could do. The Employer utterly failed
to respond to its obligation in this regard, which must result in
reversal of the Industrial Commission's final agency action, and
remand with instructions to enter an appropriate award granting
permanent, total disability benefits to Mr. Zupon.
And finally, Mr. Zupon is further entitled to an award for 50%
whole body permanent, partial impairment compensation for that
portion of his overall permanent, partial impairment attributable
to

conditions

which

preceded

his

industrial

accident.

The

Employer's failure to timely raise the affirmative defense of the
Statute of Limitations constitutes waiver with the result that the
Industrial Commission's raising it as a bar for the first time
following Mr. Zupon's filing of his Motion of Review of the
Administrative

Law

Judge's

Order
15

is

similarly

untimely

and

defective.

An appropriate award

should

issue; however, the

necessity for the entry of this additional award would be moot in
the

event

Mr.

Zupon

is awarded

permanent, total

disability

compensation since permanent, partial impairment would be merged in
his life-time award.
DATED this 23rd day of November/^1992.
SNEY & DABNEYI, p.c.
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 23rd day
of November, 1992 to the following:
(1 original & 7 copies)
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Post Office Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600

(2 copies)

Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
EMPLOYERS7 REINSURANCE FUND
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Post Office Box 146611
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611

(2 copies)

Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
CLYDE & PRATT
77 West 200 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

(2 copies)

Mr. John W. Zupon
292 Welby Street
Helper, Utah 84526

(1 copy)

File

ctopies)

VIRGI
Attorned
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1975).

EXHIBIT B;

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
(March 18, 1992).

EXHIBIT C;

Order Denying Motion for Review (August 3, 1992).

35-1-67. Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments.—In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66%$ of his average weekly wages at
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week.
However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or
its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation payments for more than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by
the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative
and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), not
to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah and m writing that such
employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division
the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order
that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66%%
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than
a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5
for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the
age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week out of t h a t special fund provided
for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with the
time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of
the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such benefits
if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein.

EXHIBIT A

Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per week.
Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who were permanently and totally
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation
benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate
sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when combined with employer
or insurance carrier compensation payments.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon
the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to
be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total
disability shall be required in such instances; in all j6ther cases, however,
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent
disability.
Tn no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of
function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury per week for 312 weeks.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 91000568

JOHN ZUPON,
Applicant,
VS«

KAISER STEEL CORPORATION (SelfInsured) /UNINSURED EMPLOYERS
FUND and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE
FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 300
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 6, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock
a.m.
Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and was represented by Virginius Dabney
Attorney.
The defendants, Kaiser Steel Corporation (Self-Insured) and/or
Uninsured Employers Fund were not represented at the hearing.
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by Erie Boorman,
Administrator.

This case involves a claim for permanent total disability benefits
related to an August 7, 1975 industrial back accident. In a stipulation filed
with the Industrial Commission on the day of the hearing, the parties stipulated
that if permanent total disability benefits were awarded, the self-insured
employer had only a 1/6 proportionate share liability in such an award and that
this share had already been paid as between the employer and the Uninsured
Employers Fund. As a result of the stipulation, only the Employers Reinsurance
Fund had potential liability and thus the only defendant at the February 6, 1992
hearing was the Employers Reinsurance Fund.
Pursuant to the stipulation, the Employers Reinsurance Fund stipulated
to a 5/6 proportionate share of liability if permanent total disability benefits
are awarded. However, the Employers Reinsurance Fund (ERF) argued at hearing
that the applicant is not entitled to an award of permanent total disability
benefits. ERF argues that the industrial injury at issue contributed very little
to the applicant's overall disability and that the 10% whole man impairment that
a prior medical panel awarded to the applicant, as related to the August 7, 1975
industrial accident, is not well founded. Even if there is a 10% whole man
impairment related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident, ERF argues that
that small amount, compared with the 50% whole man impairment that was found to
be related to pre-existing ankylosing spondylitis, was a minor contribution to
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the applicant's significant existing disability. ERF cites two cases which deal
with injured employees whose permanent disabilities were found to have been
caused by problems unrelated to the relatively minor compensable industrial
injury involved. Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 713 (Utah
1986), Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988). ERF also
argues that it was the advancement of the arthritis to the applicant's hands and
fingers, which occurred sometime after the industrial accident and was unrelated
to the industrial accident, which caused the applicant to become truly disabled.
ERF points to the Social Security Disability records as support for this
argument.
In a letter to the Employers Reinsurance Fund, dated February 5, 1992,
the applicant's attorney summarized the basis for the applicant's claim of
permanent total disability related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident.
In referring to the causal connection between the industrial accident and the
permanent total disability, that letter indicates that the applicant relies
primarily on: 1) the failure to return to work after the August 7, 1975
industrial accident and 2) the award of Social Security Disiability beginning
January 1, 1977 with a primary diagnosis of ankylosis of the lumbar spine. The
letter states:
The Decision df
the Social Security Administration,
Administrative Law Judge confirms that when the lumbar problem
extended into Mr. Zupon's extremities causing him to lose hand
and finger dexterity, he then became totally disabled. ...
Please also note that Mr. Zupon never had any problems with
his arms, hands or fingers prior to the industrial accident,
and that problems with regard to his extermitites were
subsequent to that event.
Based on the explanation above, the ALJ understands that the applicant claims
that his hand and finger problmes are somehow related to the lumbar problem.
After the hearing, the ALJ took the matter under advisement so that she
could review the medical records submitted at hearing (Exhibit A-l). The matter
was considered ready for order as soon as the records were reviewed.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant is a male who was 51 years old on the date of injury and
who is currently 67 years old. The applicant's compensation rate has been set
by prior Commission order at $155.00 per week (Exhibit E). At the time of the
applicant's industrial injury, on August 7, 1975, the applicant was employed by
Kaiser Coal Corporation in Sunnyside, Utah. He was working in mine #3 when he
was injured. The applicant's duties at the mine included maintenance and repair
of mechanical and electrical equipment and he was also the fireboss. On the date
of injury, the applicant was lifting an acetylene tank which he described as
being 5 feet long and 18 inches in diameter. The applicant estimated that the
tank weighed around 200 pounds. As he started to lift the tank off the ground,
the applicant's weight was not under the tank. The tank was off to the side of
him and thus he was twisting as he lifted the tank. The applicant stated that
he felt a sharp pain in his low back just below the beltline as he attempted to
lift the tank. The applicant stated that he could hardly walk after that.
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The applicant was seen the same day by Dr. S. Smoot at Carbon Medical
Services Association in Dragerton, Utah. Dr. Smoot's medical report for that day
indicates that X-rays were t,aken of the lumbar spine. The X-ray report indicates
that the film was read to show extensive degenerative changes and early spur
formation. Dr. Smoot decided to treat the applicant conservatively and he had
the applicant return approximately a week later (the date on the office note is
not legible). Per the office note for this follow-up visit, Dr. Smoot noted that
the applicant had aches and pains all over his body at that time. Dr. Smoot
noted that this was probably a generalized arthritic reaction. He prescribed
some wygesic and butazolidine. On August 27, 1975, Dr. Smoot again saw the
applicant and he noted that the applicant was feeling somewhat better, but that
his generalized discomforts continued. He continued the applicant on the same
medication. The September 3, 1975 office note indicates that the applicant was
still complaining of pain in the back and shoulders and "all over." Dr. Smoot
changed the applicant's medication and a week later he noted that the applicant
was still having some pain inthe mid-thoracic and lumbar area. On September 17,
1975, Dr. Smoot noted that the applicant's complaints remained the same and he
gave the applicant instructions for exercises. In follow-up on September 24,
1975, Dr. Smoot noted that the exercises had made the applicant feel worse and
that at that time he even had pain in his ears. At the applicant's request, Dr.
Smoot provided the applicant with additional pain medication.
On October 1, 1975, Dr. Smoot saw the applicant again and he noted that
the pain was worse in the shoulder. He re-X-rayed the lumbar spine and again
noted only the degenerative changes. He indicated that the applicant would
probably need an orthopedic consultation. This was not scheduled until later in
the month and thus Dr. Smoot saw the applicant twice more. On October 7, 1975
Dr. Smoot noted that the applicant had aches in all his joints. Dr. Smoot's
office note for that date also indicates that the applicant had been talking to
his brother-in-law who worked for Social Security. As a result, the applicant
asked Dr. Smoot about being "totaled out." On that same day, the applicant filed
his initial application for Social Security Disability benefits. The applicant
saw Dr. Smoot one more time on October 15, 1975 and Dr. Smoot's note for that
date indicates only that the applicant was feeling worse and that he was to see
a Dr. E. Chapman on October 20, 1975 for an orthopedic consultation.
Dr. Chapman's October 20, 1975 office note indicates that the
applicant's treatment to that point had been limited to rest and medication. He
noted that the applicant was having continued pain in the mid and lower spine
with radiation to the hips (left greater than right), with neck pains and right
arm pain. Dr. Chapman read X-rays of the dorsal spine, the lumbar spine and the
pelvis to show arthritic spurring. His assessment was that the applicant was
experiencing the residuals of an acute strain of the lower lumbar spine. He
prescribed a book on back care, a Taylor back brace, a cervical pillow and he
recommended that the applicant rest frequently and put a board under his
mattress. When Dr. Chapman saw him again on October 24, 1975, he noted that the
applicant had improved and had "taken to" the Taylor brace. Dr. Chapman's office
note states that the applicant still had back pain and was quite certain that he
could not return to his regular job at Kaiser. However, Dr. Chapman noted that
the applicant was a master electrician and would be able to do other electrical
work that was compatible with his limitations. Nonetheless, he did not release
the applicant to return to work at that time.
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When Dr. Chapman saw tne applicant again on November 13, 1975, he noted
that the applicant had experienced a recurrence of pain when he tried to be more
active. He noted that the applicant's side talent as an electrician would not
be helpful to him since it , involved activities such as crawling in attics and
pulling on conduit. He precribed darvon for the applicant and indicated he did
not need to return for another 3 months, at which time he would be rated. He
again indicated that the applicant was unable to return to work at that time.
The next medical treatment noted in the medical records was an admit to
Castleview Hospital from January 8, 1976 to January 13, 1976 for a
hemorrhoidectomy. The applicant saw Dr. Chapman again on February 2, 1976 and
Dr. Chapman noted that the applicant was progressively getting worse with pain
throughout his lumbar spine and pain in the elbows and shoulders. Dr. Chapman
was of the opinion that surgery would not be helpful. He opined that the
applicant would not be able to retrun to work as a miner and he determined that
the applicant had a 50% loss of body function as a result of the industrial
injury. This apparently was some kind of a rough estimate and was not an
impairment rating, because in the same office note, Dr. Chapman indicates that
he would not assign a disability rating due to the complicated nature of the
disability. He recommended that the applicant obtain a rating from an Industrial
Commission medical panel. ^When Dr. Chapman completed his "final bill" for the
carrier, on February 19, 1976, he indicated on it that the applicant was still
unable to return to work. He noted that the applicant had a severe residual
disability and that it was difficult to separate the possible pre-existing
problem from the industrial portion. He again noted on this billing that the
applicant should be seen by an Industrial Commission medical panel to be rated.
The applicant apparently did file an application for hearing with the
Industrial Commission sometime after his February visit with Dr. Chapman. While
the application was being processed and the matter was being set for hearing, the
applicant again returned to Dr. Chapman on June 22, 1976. On this visit, the
applicant complained of pain in the shoulders, elbows and hands.
Per Dr.
Chapman's office note, this had been present prior to the date of injury for 6
or 7 years, but had gradually become worse and quite severe within the last year.
Dr. Chapman did shoulder X-rays and found these to be negative, but elbow and
hand X-rays were read to show arthritic narrowing and spurring. After reviewing
the X-rays, Dr. Chapman listed the applicant's diagnoses as: 1) progressive
arthritis of the spine, shoulders, elbows and hands and 2) possible entrapment
of flexor tendon, middle finger, right hand. Dr. Chapman concluded that the
applicant was permanently disabled for his regular occupation in the coal mine
due to progressive generalized arthritis. This was the applicant's last visit
with Dr. Chapman.
On August 23, 1976, the applicant attended a hearing at the Industrial
Commission. The ALJ who heard that case referred the matter to a medical panel.
Thereafter, the applicant saw Dr. A. MacArthur, presumably an orthopedic
physician, on September 28, 1976. Dr. MacArthur's records are found in the
medical record exhibit under the tab for Dr. Chapman's records. Dr. Chapman is
associated with the Central Utah Orthopedic Clinic in Provo, Utah and it may be
that Dr. MacArthur is also associated with that clinic. That information is not
in the medical record exhibit. Another possibility is that Dr. MacArthur has a
separate practice and Dr. Chapman referred the applicant there for a second
opinion. At any rate, Dr. MacArthur's analysis of the applicant's condition is
quite differenct from that of Dr. Chapman.
Dr. MacArthur noted that the
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applicant's chief complaint was back pain subsequent to an acute lumbar strain
from which the applicant did not improve. He noted that the applicant was
experiencing constant pain and stiffness, but no leg pain. Per Dr. MacArthur's
office note, the applicant's symptoms were aggravated by any activity and the
applicant felt he was getting worse. Dr. MacArthur's office note indicates that
there was no numbness or weakness, no abnormal gait or stance, no spinous process
tenderness, no sensory or motor defecits, and no spasm. He noted that the
applicant had been under no active treatment program. He concluded that he did
not bjelieve that the applicant had back pain significant enough to keep him from
working. He recommended return to work unless something could be detected by way
of radiological studies. When Dr. MacArthur reviewed films on October 5r 1976,
he noted that the X-rays showed only very minimal arthritic changes and nothing
he could put together with the applicant's history and physical which would cause
the applicant to be unable to return to work or to be restricted in his work.
On November 24, 1976, the Industrial Commission medical panel issued its
report (Tab D, Exhibit A-l). The medical panel read the applicant's X-rays to
show sacroiliac sclerosis and arthritic changes along the entire lumbar spine
consistent with the clinical impression of ankylosing spondylitis. The panel
concluded that the applicant was physically capable of doing light work but was
unable to do mining or mechanical work. The panel rated the applicant as having
a 60% whole person permanent impairment (without taking into consideration his
loss of eyesight in the left eye) and the panel attributed 10% of that impairment
to the industrial injury because there was "a one-in-six chance that the
ankylosing spondylitis was aggravated by the lumbar back strain on the basis of
the progression of the X-ray changes, and this man's inability to return to
work." The panel concluded that there was no need for future medical care
related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident. On February 10, 1977, the
prior ALJ in this matter issued a on order awarding the applicant permanent
impairment benefits based on the 10% whole person impairment rated by the panel
as being related to the industrial accident.
While the matter was under adjudication at the Industrial Commission,
the applicant was going through the process of applying for Social Security
Disability benefits (see Tab L, Exhibit A-l generally). The applicant's initial
application was denied and the applicant applied for a hearing that was held on
June 15, 1976. After the hearing, the applicant was again denied in a decision
issued on November 19, 1976. This decision was affirmed on appeal to the Appeals
Council on January 18, 1977, but the matter was reopened in late 1977 as will be
noted to follow.
In April of 1977, the applicant was apparently rerated by the VA with
respect to his impairment or disability. There is a medical record indicating
that the rating was apportioned as follows: 40% anklosing spondylitis, 30% left
eye, and 10% right elbow, for a combined rating of 60%. The ALJ is not real sure
how these military ratings are determined, but understands that the rating system
is not consistent with the system specified in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation
of Permanent Impairment.
In December of 1977, the applicant filed unspecified "new evidence" with
Social Security that resulted in the U.S. District Court remanding the matter to
Social Security for consideration of the new evidence. A supplemental hearing
was conducted on May 31, 1978 and the decision to award benefits was issued on
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July 11, 1978. That decision (found under Tab L, Exhibit A-l, pp. 157-161) notes
that the applicant's arthritis in his hands became much worse starting in January
of 1977. In contrast, the applicant actually noted some improvement in his back
pain as a result of losing 30 pounds between January and May 1978 (Exhibit A-l,
p. 158). The decision goes on to note that the industrial injury most likely had
only a minimal effect on the applicant's disability and notes that the applicant
was net considered disabled until the arthritis in the hands and fingers became
acute in January 1977. The decision states:
Assuming that the medical panel was correct, his percentage of
disability was increased only 10% by the industrial accident.
It does not appear the additional impairment resulting from
the back strain would be sufficient to preclude claimant from
all substantial work. However, the claimant maintains that in
addition he has lost hand and finger dexterity.
.. . The
administrative law judge is impressed with the sincerity of
the claimant when he testified that beginning in January 1977
he lost the dexterity of in his hands. Until that time the
claimant is not deemed to have been disabled but considering
the credibility of the claimant's testimony as to the effect
of arthritis in his hands and fingers together with his other
impairments, it is found that he claimant became disabled
January 1, 1977 which disability has been continuing.
(Exhibit A-l, pp. 160-161). The Social Security ALJ noted that prior to the
problems with the hands, the vocational expert indicated that the applicant was
capable of performing light electrical work.
There are no medical records in the medical record exhibit (Exhibit A-l)
indicating any actual treatment for back pain or lumbar problems after 1976. In
December of 1981, the applicant was reevaluated by Dr. C. Bench, apparently to
determine whether Social Security Disability benefits would continue at that
point. Dr. Bench's report is located at Tab L, Exhibit A-l(pp. 164-165). After
examination his impression was: 1) history of low back pain and low back injury,
rule out ankylosing spondylitis, 2) rule out rheumatoid arthritis, 3) cervical
spondylosis with headaches, 4) traumatic injury left eye, rendered blind, 5)
chronic sinusitis and 6) obesity. In an addendum report, Dr. Bench noted that
the rheumatoid factor tests were negative and he revised his impressions as
follows: 1) early cervical spondylosis with early degenerative disk disease of
C5-6, 2) low back pain secondary to degenerative disk disease L5-S1 moderate in
severity, 3) pain in the right shoulder secondary to some right sub-acromial
bursitis and degenerative arthritis of the right AC joint, to a minimal degree.
His comment was: "I think this patient's symptoms are way out of proportion to
the objective findings which are presented."
From February 10, 1983 through May 25, 1983, the applicant was an
inpatient in Castleview Hospital and the University of Utah Hospital with
extensive intestinal problems and several surgeries.
The applicant had
postoperative septicemia and renal failure with gastrointestinal bleeding and it
was necessary for him to be monitored in the intensive care unit for several
weeks. It is unclear what if any impairment resulted due to this extended
intensive treatment and surgery.
In May and June of 1988, the applicant
apparently underwent cardiac evaluation as noted by the Holter Monitor tests done
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at the Salt Lake Clinic. Those records are somewhat unclear with respect to what
conclusions were made as a result of the tests.
With respect to pre-existing conditions, the applicant sustained a
perforating wound to his left cornea while working in a mine in October of 1954.
There are a couple medical records from this incident under Tab H in the medical
record exhibit. The applicant testified at hearing that he was hit in the left
wrist, by a pitched ball when playing baseball in 1941, but there are no medial
records from this incident and the applicant indicated that he had had no
problems with the wrist subsequent to 1941. He stated that he had no breathing
problems resulting from his years of work in the mines.
The applicant completed the 11th grade in highschool. The applicant's
work history includes working for the railroad for 2 years, some electrical work
and training in the service for 4 years and thereafter in underground mines (from
1946 through 1975). The applicant indicated that while he was employed working
in the mines he also did some electrical contracting and furnace installation on
the side. The applicant stated that after his back injury in 1975, he tried to
get work as a fireboss again but was denied jobs because he could not pass the
physical. His wife testified that the applicant did try to find work, but the
X-rays of his back always prevented him from passing the physicals.
The applicant was paid 25 weeks of temporary total compensation by the
employer from August of 1976 to February of 1976. In February of 1976, he began
receiving union disability pension benefits (amount unspecified) and he
apparently continues to receive this along with his social security benefits
(amount also unspecified). In February of 1977, he began receiving non-service
connected VA disability benefits ($200.00 per month).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The ALJ finds that the applicant has failed to sustain his burden of
proof in establishing a medical causal connection between his permanent inability
to work and the August 7, 1975 industrial injury. The ALJ finds that there are
two main reasons why the evidence does not support the requisite causal
connection. First, the evidence shows that it was the arthritic condition in the
hands and fingers that truly caused the applicant to be unable to work, not the
ankylosing spondylitis in the lumbar spine. Second, even if one were to presume
that the ankylosing spondylitis was causing the applicant to be disabled, the
industrial injury did not cause the ankylosing spondylitis and only questionably
aggravated it.
A.

The Cause of the Inability to Work:

The July 11, 1978 Social Security Disability (SSD) decision makes it
very clear that Social Security found that the applicant became unable to perform
gainful employment when the arthritis in his hands and fingers became severe in
January 1977, and not before that. The applicant was denied Social Security
Disability benefits in a series of decisions prior to when SSD gave consideration
to the onset of arthritis in the extremities. Therefore, Social Security found
that the applicant's lumbar problems, even with the aggravation that may have
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been caused by the industrial back injury, was not a sufficient disabling
condition to cause him to be unable to perform any gainful work. The vocational
expert who testified at the May 1978 SSD hearing indicated that there were jobs
in the region where the applicant lived that he could have performed in 1978
(after the industrial injury) if he had not lost the dexterity in his hands and
fingers. The July 11, 1978 Social Security decision re-emphasizes this in very
plain terms. Although this ALJ is not bound in any way by the findings of the
Social Security Administration, this ALJ finds the SSD decision very relevant and
convincing. It is convincing because other evidence presented to this ALJ, to
be discussed below, is consistent with the SSD determination that it was the
arthritis in the hands that caused the applicant to be totally disabled, and not
the anklosing spondylitis in the lumbar spine, which caused the applicant to be
only partially disabled (unable to perform the demanding work in the mines and
as a building construction electrician).
The applicant has argued that the arthritis in the hands and fingers is
somehow related or was somehow caused by the lumbar condition. The February 5,
1992 letter to the Administrator of the Employers Reinsurance Fund, noted at the
beginning of this Order, refers to when the "lumbar problem extended into Mr.
Zupon's extremities." Unfortunately, there is no medical evidence at all which
even suggests that the lumbar condition and the condition in the hands and
fingers is somehow related.
The applicant has pointed out that he had no
problems in his hands until after the industrial accident, but there needs to be
more than just a sequential finding to say that the lumbar back strain on August
7, 1975 caused the progressive degenerative arthritis in the hands and fingers.
In addition, the applicant's argument is this regard is not clearly supported by
the medical records. Dr. Chapman noted that the applicant had been having
problems with his hands and fingers for 6 or 7 years prior to the date of injury
and that it became more severe in 1977. It is the applicant's burden to present
supportive medical evidence for his theories on the medical causal connection
between the work injury and the disabling condition.
In arguing that the
arthritis in the extremities is related to the back strain, the ALJ finds that
the applicant has failed to sustain this burden.
B.

The Contribution of the Industrial Injury?

Although the ALJ finds that the analysis under A. above is sufficient
to sustain a finding that permanent total disability benefits are not payable,
the ALJ feels it is appropriate to also discuss the limited role the industrial
injury played in the applicant's overall disability.
The applicant has
emphasized that he did not return to work after the industrial injury and has
pointed out that a prior medical panel found that the industrial injury
permanently aggravated his pre-existing ankylosing spondylitis. However, the
medical evidence presented for this adjudication leaves the ALJ with some
question regarding why the applicant did not return to work after the industrial
injury and leaves the ALJ with some real questions regarding the prior medical
panel's finding that the applicant sustained a 10% whole person impairment as a
result of the industrial injury.
After the industrial back strain on August 7, 1975, the applicant
received only conservative care for his back for several months. No acute injury
to the spine was ever diagnosed radiologically. Surgery was never recommended
or performed. There are no medical records regarding treatment for the back from
1976 forward. The 1976 medical panel concluded that the applicant would need no
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future treatment for the'back related to the industrial injury. The office notes
of the doctors that treated the applicant just after the industrial .injury (Dr.
Smoot and Dr. Chapman) include regular mention of pain or limited use in many
areas of the body besides the lumbar spine. The shoulders, the mid-thoracic
spine, the hips, the neck and the elbows are all mentioned. Dr. Smoot noted
aches in "all joints" at one point and even mentions ear pain.
The medical
evidence seems to suggest that the applicant was experiencing symptoms related
to what Dr. Chapman diagnosed as "progressive arthritis of the spine, shoulders,
elbows and hands."
Dr. MacArthur concluded in September 1976 that the
applicant's back pain was not so severe as to prevent him from working and Dr.
MacArthur went so far as to state that the applicant needed no work restrictions.
As late as 1981, when the applicant was re-evaluated for SSD by Dr. Bench, the
medical conclusion was that the applicant's symptoms greatly exceeded any
objective findings.
In spite of the above findings, this ALJ would probably have done what
the previous Industrial Commission ALJ did and would have given the applicant the
benefit of the doubt by awarding the 10% whole person impairment that the medical
panel attributed to the industrial injury. However, this would have been giving
the applicant the extreme benefit of the doubt.
This ALJ has never seen a
medical panel finding of impairment that is based on a 1 in 6 chance that there
might have been an aggravation. The ALJ recognizes that there is some doubt in
any medical conclusion, but the ALJ has always been of the impression that there
should be a greater than 50% chance before the medical experts can say something
probably caused something else. If it is less than 50%, or a lot less as in this
case, then the ALJ would think that the panel would have to say it is NOT more
likely than not that the connection exists.
Notwithstanding the highly questionable analysis of the prior panel,
even if one concedes that the industrial injury caused 10% whole person
impairment, this is still a very minimal portion of the applicant's overall
disability or impairment. If not for the causation problems discussed above, the
ALJ might find that the 1/6 contribution was sufficient to support a finding that
the industrial injury caused the total disability. However, considering all the
other evidence, the ALJ must conclude that there is insufficient supportive
evidence to find that the industrial injury caused the applicant's total
disability.
As such, the applicant's claim for permanent total disability
benefits related to the August 7, 1975 industrial injury must be dismissed.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for permanent total
disability benefits related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident is
dismissed for failure to establish a medical causal connection between the
industrial accident and the applicant's total disability.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall
be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in
detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, this Order
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.
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The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of respondent in the above captioned matter, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant filed a claim for permanent total disability
benefits related to in industrial injury on August 7, 1975. A
hearing was held on February 6, 1992. In her decision of March 18,
1992, the administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the applicant's
claim. The applicant timely filed this motion for review and was
granted additional time to submit a memorandum in support of his
motion. The applicant submitted a memorandum two months after the
time had expired for submission of his memorandum.
1. DID THE ALJ APPLY THE WRONG STANDARD OF PROOF?
The applicant asserts that he was prejudiced by the ALJ's use
of a "higher standard of proof than is found in the law." It is
unclear what "higher standard" the applicant believes was used
here, but examination of the record indicates that the ALJ
correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the
issue of medical causation. See Allen v.Industrial Commission,
729 P.2d 15, 23 (Utah 1986). The ALJ found that the applicant
failed to establish medical causation by a preponderance of the
evidence and denied the applicant's claim for permanent total
disability.
The ALJ relied on Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954
(Ct. App. 1988) which held that a showing of medical causation was
required under Allen.
U.C.A. 35-1-69 was construed to require a
showing of medical and legal causation to support an award for
permanent total compensation. Id.
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2. DID THE ALJV IMPROPERLY ANALYZE THE CLAIM AS ONE
BASED ON LUMBAR PROBLEMS IN CONJUNCTION WITH
ARTHRITIC DISABILITY IN THE HANDS AND FINGERS?
Utah Code Annotated 35-1-69 provided that:
If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent
incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or congenital
causes, sustains an industrial injury for which
compensation and medical care is provided by this title
that results
in permanent
incapacity
which
is
substantially greater than he would have incurred if he
had not had the pre-existing incapacity, compensation
and medical care . . . shall be awarded.11
U.C.A. 35-1-69 (Supp. 1974). The statute contemplates that the
compensation and medical care for the preexisting impairment will
be paid out of the Second Injury Fund.
Chavez, v. Industrial
Commission, 709 P,2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1985); See Intermountain
Health Care. Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977).
i

U.C.A. 35-1-69 must be read in light of the other provisions
of the statute. In Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P. 2d 954
(Ct. App. 1988) the Utah Court of Appeals agreed with an ALJ of the
Industrial Commission who found that the language of 35-1-67
implies that there must be a causal connection between the
industrial injury and the permanent total disability. Id. at 956.
The Court of Appeals held that proof of a causal connection is
required under Allen v. Industrial Commission Id. Therefore, the
applicant "for permanent total disability benefits must prove
medically that his disability was caused by an industrial
accident." Jd.
It is important to note that Large construes
language in the statute that predates the 1988 amendment.
Therefore, it appears that Large is controlling in this case and
the applicant must show a causal connection between his industrial
accident and his permanent total disability in order to receive
benefits.
The applicant asserts that Marshall v. Industrial Commission,
704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985) requires the Commission to apply the law
as it existed at the time of the applicants injury. Marshall
stands for the proposition that benefits to be awarded in workers7
compensation cases are to be determined based on the statute as it
existed at the time of injury. Although the applicant was injured
in August 1975, he did not file his application for a hearing on
permanent total disability until May 24, 1991.
The relevant
language in 35-1-67 was amended to require a showing of a causal
connection in 1988. Thus, all case law construing the statute
prior to 1988 should apply in the interpretation of the statute.
Under Large, the applicant is required to show a causal connection
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between his industrial accident and his permanent disability. The
applicant failed to show the requisite causal connection and,
therefore, his request for permanent total disability was properly
denied by the ALJ.
3. DID THE ALJ IMPROPERLY FIND THAT THE INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT WAS NOT THE MEDICAL CAUSE OF
THE APPLICANT'S DISABILITY?
The applicant attempted to show that the August 7, 1975
industrial accident was the medical cause of his permanent total
disability by showing that he never returned to work after the
accident and that he was awarded social security disability
benefits beginning on January 1, 1911.
The social security decision to award benefits noted that the
arthritis in the applicant's hands became much worse beginning in
January 1977 and observed that the applicant's industrial injury
most likely had minimal effect on the applicant's disability. The
Social Security Administration (SSA) did not consider the applicant
to be disabled until the arthritis in his hands and fingers became
acute in 1977. Prior to that time, the vocational expert who
testified at the SSA hearing indicated that there were jobs that
the applicant could perform in 1978 had he not lost dexterity in
his hands and fingers. Although the SSA hearing is not binding on
the commission under the statute in effect at the time of the
applicant's injury, it is relevant to determining the extent of the
applicant's disability as well as its causal connection to the
applicant's industrial injury.
Examination of the applicant's medical records shows that he
received no treatment for back pain or lumbar pain after 1976.
Office notes of the doctors who treated the applicant immediately
following the industrial accident regularly mention pain or limited
use in many areas of the body, suggesting that the applicant was
experiencing symptoms of progressive arthritis of the spine,
shoulders,elbows and hands. Upon examination of the applicant in
1976, Dr. MacArthur*concluded that the applicant's back pain was
not so severe as to prevent him from working. In 1981, when the
applicant was re-evaluated for SSA by Dr. Bench, the doctor
concluded that the applicant's symptoms greatly exceeded his
objective findings. Thus, the medical records do not establish a
medical causal connection between the applicant's August 7, 1975
industrial injury and his permanent total disability.
4. SHOULD THE ALJ HAVE AWARDED THE APPLICANT A
FIFTY PERCENT WHOLE PERSON IMPAIRMENT FOR THE
PRE-EXISTING IMPAIRMENT IDENTIFIED BY THE
1976 MEDICAL PANEL?
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Review of the applicant's Application for Hearing and the
record, indicates that the applicant never requested consideration
of a claim for permanent partial disability. Under 35-1-66 (Supp.
1974), a claim for permanent partial disability benefits must be
filed within 8 years of the date of injury. In the present case,
the applicant filed his'application for hearing sixteen years after
the injury. Therefore, the time for filing an application for
permanent partial disability benefits had run when the applicant
filed his application for permanent total disability benefits on
May 24, 1991.
5. DID THE ALJ FAIL TO DELINEATE ADEQUATE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW?
The applicant asserts that the Order fails to delineate
adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the
ALJ's Order in light of Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv.
Rep. 18 (1991) , indicates that the ALJ made findings sufficient to
"disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached."
Milne Truck
Lines, Inc. v.- Public^ Service Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah
1979) cited in Adams, at 20. The ALJ's findings of fact and
conclusions of law are sufficient to show what issues were decided,
legal interpretations and applications made, as well as the
subsidiary factual findings which support her decision. See Adams
at 21.
Therefore, the commission finds that the ALJ's Order
contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to
support her decision to deny benefits to the applicant.
6. WAS THE ALJ'S DECISION ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS?
Review of the record indicates that there is substantial
evidence to support the ALJ's findings. The applicant failed to
delineate his specific objections in sufficient enough detail to
allow the commission to address them.
However, review of the
entire record indicates that the ALJ's findings are not arbitrary
and capricious.

John Zupon
Order
Page five
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated March 18, 1992 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16.
The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes.
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